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Introduction 
 
Shanghai was probably the first large metropolis to experience large-scale modern warfare in 
its very midst. Bitter and brutal fighting raged for three months in and around the city, with 
intense bombings from ships and planes. The war threw literally hundred of thousands of 
people on the streets. As war expanded to the countryside, millions became refugees. This 
paper is concerned with the massive and sudden transformation of Shanghai residents into 
refugees and its impact on the city and its resources. In the first part, I address the issue of war 
in Shanghai and its past experience with refugee issues. I argue that 1937 created an entirely 
new situation no authority was prepared to meet. The second part is devoted to a study of the 
refugee population, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. In fact,  those who found refuge 
in camps  -- a small part of the refugees – do not reflect the normal structure of the local 
population. The last part is concerned with the challenges refugee camps had to face to 
maintain alive a huge destitute population with limited resources in an overcrowded urban 
space engulfed in war. 
 
I. Shanghai and the experience of war 
 
The experience of war was not totally new to Shanghai, and neither the sudden and massive 
arrival of destitute population was a novelty. In fact, since the nineteenth century, the city had 
seen various waves of refugees that were either linked to natural disasters or, more often, to 
human conflicts. The first demographic take off of Shanghai had taken place on the heel of 
the Taiping Rebellion when thousands of well-off and not so well-off Chinese sought peace 
and safety in the foreign settlements. This was also the time of a local rebellion by secret 
societies – the Small Sword rebellion – in the walled city, though the extent of damages was 
due more to fire than fighting. Thereafter, Shanghai lived under a sort of “pax occidentalia” 
thanks to the presence of the well-protected (and sometimes heavily guarded) foreign 
settlements. Whereas war or upheavals shook various places in China, Shanghai remained 
immune to fighting.  Even the numerous warlord wars of the first two decades of the twentieth 
century circled around the city, but never touched it.  
 
Because of its quick development and the wealth that increasingly accumulated within its 
walls, Shanghai worked as a magnet for impoverished population from the countryside from 
all over the country. Of course, the neighboring provinces provided the largest contingents, 
but the reputation of the city had reached China’s furthest confines. As a result, there was a 
constant stream of poor people who made their way to Shanghai with the hope to get rich or 
simply find a decent job. These populations settled down at the periphery in hand-made straw 
and mud huts. They were known as the penghu population (squatter) that the foreign 
authorities expelled regularly from their territories. As a result, they congregated in the 
Chinese municipality. In other words, Shanghai lived with a certain amount of floating 
population almost nobody took notice of unless they became a nuisance. Yet, the city was 
overburdened at times by large waves of refugees in times of flood or dearth. To meet these 
situations, there was a whole array of benevolent societies that provided help, food, and 
shelter in emergency situations. While they were originally and primarily geared toward 
helping the local poor, they possessed the capacity for management and the financial 
resources to face such specific situations. This proved to be an important asset for wartime. 
 
In the winter of 1931-1932, when the Japanese Navy launched its first attack on the city, 
Shanghai experienced for the first time both the brunt of modern warfare and the combination 
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of intra-muros fighting and refugees. The hostilities did not last very long. The Chinese army 
was not prepared and organized beyond the locally based Cantonese 19th Army. The Chinese 
state was eager to bring the conflict to an early stop and avoid any possible extension. It 
exhibited restrain in the use of military means (no use of the air force). These conditions 
notwithstanding, there was tremendous physical damage in the northern districts of Hongkou 
and Zhabei, with rows of buildings entirely bombed or burned down.1 The population had 
been taken by surprise and was unable to migrate en masse as would happen five years later. 
They had to be rescued at great risks for those who volunteered. Victims were numerous, 
though no proper account was ever established. Nevertheless, the conflict remained limited in 
scope, use of arms and geographically. It was centered plainly on two districts. The rest of the 
population in the foreign settlements or the Chinese municipality were not affected directly. 
There was no collateral damage. This conflict gave the local associations the first opportunity 
to run a system of support to refugees on a large scale under the supervision of the municipal 
authorities.2 
 
a. War as ultimate disorder 
 
In 1937, when war dawned again on Shanghai, tragedy and misery hit almost every corner of 
the whole city. A full-fledged military battle was fought for three months in, over and around 
the city, taking millions of civilians as actual though unintended targets, creating total chaos 
among the residents, and installing disorder as normality. This was the first such experience 
for a metropolis the size of Shanghai that by then ranked as the fifth city in the world (3.5 
million). What also made it unusual was its political structure. The foreign settlements, that 
represented the most developed part and the actual center of the city, were administered by 
foreign powers. Their extraterritorial status made them an island of relative protection in 
times of upheaval, but in 1937 the effects of modern war blurred these distinctions. In an area 
of less than six square miles that normally cared for a population of close to two millions, war 
brought in just a few weeks utterly destitute refugees by the hundred of thousands. As one 
district after the other, within and on every side of the city – except the foreign settlements3 – 
came under the scourge of war, there followed almost complete evacuation of the 
dispossessed to the settlements. 
 
The most immediate consequence of war was dislocation. War brought the spoliation of great 
portions of all forms of industry, communication, commerce and ordered life. All forms of 
weaponry were used during this hard-fought battle. The Nationalist government has decided 
to make Shanghai an example in resisting the Japanese. It was definitely a pointless and 
strategically disastrous strategy that only brought increased and unnecessary suffering to 
civilians and soldiers alike.4 The populous districts of Zhabei and Honkou in the north were 
the primary targets, along with Yangshupu, the large industrial district of the city, as in 1932. 
Fighting and bombings raged for weeks. Then uncontrolled fires – fighting prevented any 
intervention by firemen -- razed the area to the ground. To increase their military pressure, the 
Japanese army also disembarked troops in the south and attacked the southern districts – the 
former walled city and its suburbs known as Nantao, south of the French Concession. The 
                                                 
1 On the 1931-1932 conflict in Shanghai, see Henriot, Christian, Shanghai 1927-1937. Municipal Power, Locality, and 
Modernization, Berkeley, The University Press of California, 1993, chap. 4. 
2 The most thorough study on the subject of refugees and the role of local elites is Feng, Yi, « Elites locales et solidarités 
régionales. L’aide aux réfugiés à Shanghai (1937-1940), » Etudes chinoises, XV, no 1-2, 1996, pp. 71-106. 
3  In fact, the eastern district (Yangshupu) of the International Settlement was completely engulfed in the fighting and then 
occupied by the Japanese army. Yangshupu was the major industrial district of Shanghai. 
4 In fact, for the sole sake of resistance, the Nationalist government sacrificed in three months one half of its best trained 
officers and battalions. [X] 
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area had not experienced war since the Small Sword Society upheaval. Finally, the bombing 
of helpless civilians by Japanese or Chinese planes also added to the list of victims that sought 
refuge in the foreign settlements. Few villages within a 50-mile radius of Shanghai escaped 
attention and thousands of unfortunate non-combattants were bombed out of their homes. 
 
A major difference in the conflict of 1937 was the use of airforce, with most tragic 
consequences. Repeated and heavy bombing by Chinese and Japanese planes brought 
incredible damage. They flew all over the city, with no care for the foreign settlements or 
areas of refuge, in pursuit of their intended targets or chasing each other. Unfortunately, their 
degree of accuracy was far from ideal. Twice, Chinese planes – never officially recognized – 
accidentally dropped huge bombs in the most congested areas of the city, making thousands 
of civilian casualties in seconds. Shanghai residents were struck by the horrific scenes of 
bombings in the city and in the vicinity: “Children in blood-drenched rags being carried 
through the streets in rickshaws, exhausted women enquiring directions to the nearest 
hospital, men, dazed and weak from loss of blood, with wounds untreated for several days. 
Such were the cases which wandered into Shanghai almost daily from the surrounding 
countryside.”5 
 
As we shall see below, the most direct consequence of war was intense population movement. 
The massive migration took place in a context where all communications and transportation 
were suspended for months, either by land or by sea. The normal traffic of goods and persons 
was completely halted. Only a limited movement was organized, with the consent of the 
belligerents, to ship out a part of the residents to their native places. Yet this was a trickle in 
the human sea that overwhelmed the city from all sides. With the extension of war inland, 
going back to one’s native place became less and less an enviable option. Fighting also lead to 
a complete blockade of goods, especially food and medicine. While supply resumed 
progressively after mid-November, for three months the situation was especially tensed and 
food prices just shot up. It made life more expensive for all residents. It made the organization 
of assistance to the hundreds of thousands of refugees a nightmare. Last, timing was also an 
important factor. The armed conflict broke out in mid-August. When it finally moved away 
from Shanghai in mid-November, the city was still saddled with almost a million refugees and 
cold weather was about to set in. Even with the fairly mild climate Shanghai enjoys in winter, 
people could not be left on the pavement, in tent-like shelters or without winter clothing. 
 
b. Population exodus 
 
In the 1931-1932 conflict, the population had been caught unaware in the middle of the 
fighting. The foreign settlements had closed their iron gates as soon as the conflict had begun 
and the population was hardly allowed into the foreign settlements. The Chinese municipal 
authorities had to organize the evacuation of civilians from the fighting areas to the war-free 
districts of the municipality.6 Because the conflict was also limited to Shanghai, people could 
also easily and safely go back to their native places. In 1937, the general configuration was 
radically different. War had already begun for good in July after the Marco Polo Bridge 
incident. The Japanese army was advancing decisively across the North China plain. In other 
words, the population was keenly aware that local tensions anywhere could easily escalade 
into a full-fledged conflict. When two Japanese marines were shot by Chinese soldiers on 
August 9 in Shanghai, the pretext for war that the Japanese navy sought was just at hand. All 
                                                 
5 « Shanghai handles nearly 20,000 casualties », Special supplement of the “China Weekly Review”, 4 December 1937, p. 6. 
6 Henriot, Christian, Shanghai 1927-1937. Municipal Power, Locality, and Modernization, Berkeley, The University Press of 
California, 1993, pp. 87-91. 
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good-will interventions and mediations from the foreign authorities notwithstanding, the 
residents of the previously destroyed districts did not miss the first signals of the military 
built-up that started. The wealthier residents began to relocate goods and family in the foreign 
settlements. Tension ran increasingly high when it became clear that the Chinese would not 
bend to Japanese demands. The flow of refugee-to-be quickly swelled and clogged the streets 
to the International Settlement. When the Chinese mayor decided to abandon the Civic Center 
in Jiangwan, the local population became more panicky and a massive exodus occurred.7 
 
This was the first stage of a massive movement of population that affected all the Chinese-
administered districts. When Nantao came under attack, the French Concession had to face 
the same unraveling wave of refugees. With hundred of thousands of refugees all over the 
place, the French authorities decided to block the influx of population into their territory. 
Helpless and mostly destitute people assembled before the heavily guarded iron gates of the 
concession. The authorities were caught between humanitarian considerations and the fear of 
welcoming more refugees in their already resource-strained territory. Eventually, the initiative 
of a Jesuit, Father Jacquinot, provided a solution for the refuge-seeking population of South 
Shanghai. The last and third wave of refugees came when the Chinese army withdrew to the 
Western outskirts of the city on 27 October 1937. It caused a large influx of civilian refugees 
from these areas. It was decided on human ground to relax the previous restrictions on their 
entry into the settlement.8 While there are no definite figures, it was estimated from all 
observers that nearly a million people were obliged to abandon their home during the 
Shanghai crisis.9 This was also the consensus among the municipal officials on all sides.  
 
This episode of Shanghai history, like many such episodes in other places in China, is hardly 
present in collective memory beyond the conventional clichés of official history. While there 
is a massive body of testimonies by Chinese and foreign witnesses, thousands of images and 
photographs, the recollection of the tragedy of residents-turned-refugees in their own city still 
awaits a fuller account. For reasons that are due to the actual course of history – there was no 
“post-war” in China – and the elaboration of a communist official historiography that 
excluded the individual and glossed over human dramas, a genuine “memory of war” hardly 
exists in China. The Sino-Japanese conflict was downgraded to a war between evil and good, 
between a heroic and anonymous “people” under the far-sighted guidance of the Chinese 
Communist Party and cruel, often beat-like, Japanese soldiery. Looking back to war-torn 
Shanghai in the summer of 1937, the trauma was intense. In a matter of days, close to a 
million people became refugees; hundreds of thousands just lost everything they had; most 
left in haste leaving all their belonging behind. But material goods were just one aspect of an 
experience that entailed multiple human tragedies: “Harassed by acute fear; staggered by 
heavy burdens and at great expense, indescribable scenes of misery and discomfort followed. 
Separation of families; lost children; pitifully helpless sick and aged; child-births by the way; 
women struggling with little children over blasted railway tracks and bridges; crowded boat-
trains bombed in the canals; repeated scattering from busses and trains to the field, as 
overhead the dreaded zoom of airplanes threatened...”10 This quotation aptly encapsulates the 
experience of ordinary Shanghai residents on the beginning of a journey into the unknown. 
                                                 
7 Decimal files, 793.94/9298, 12 August 1937, NARA. 
8 5361 Shanghai intelligence summaries, October-December 1937, n° 30, 29 October 1937, p. 57, WO106, PRO 
9 Decimal files, 102.81, 25 August 1937; Nagler, Etha M. “The problem of food and shelter for refugees in Shanghai”, China 
Quarterly, 3, 1, p. 67 
10 Boone, W.D., “Shanghai’s refugee problem”, China Quarterly, 3, 1, p. 61. 
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c. Soldiers and civilians: The competition for resources 
 
During the first weeks and months of fighting, the human and material resources of the city 
were drawn upon to a high degree. The civic leaders of the city had to organize the assistance 
to the massive refugee population in a context of normalcy – as when they had faced the 
arrival of the victims of the 1931 Yangzi flood – but in the very place where a full war raged, 
with all its consequences, especially the need to accommodate wounded soldiers. The present 
paper is concerned with civilian refugees, but in the summer of 1937, actual relief work fell 
into two categories: wounded soldiers and civilian refugees. Separate committees were set up 
to address these problems.11 Thanks to the exceptional sanitary infrastructure of the city, 
around 5,000 wounded soldiers could be accommodated in the existing hospitals of the 
settlements at any date.12 Yet this comparative advantage was no match for the demand 
created on both the military and civilian sides of the conflict. When the massive wave of 
refugees hit the ground of the foreign settlements, the sanitary establishments were already 
heavily strained and short on medicines. The situation was made even more difficult by the 
complete inadequacy of the sanitary organization of the Chinese military. Medical support for 
wounded soldiers was completely inadequate.13  
 
The burden placed on the local hospitals was heavier for the Chinese army cared for only a 
very small percentage of the army’s wounded. The large majority were left to relief societies, 
to free wards in municipal and mission hospitals, or, as in most cases, became a liability on 
the hands of already burdened relatives. There was never a centralized organ that has 
functioned in assuming responsibility for immediate or future care of the wounded.14 Funds 
for the treatment and evacuation of Chinese wounded soldiers came mainly from more than 
28 philanthropic organizations. The Red Cross established 24 hospitals and 18 frontline first 
aid stations during the conflict.15 Yet the increased burden of caring for wounded soldiers  
proved much more expensive than original estimates.16 Reports from Red Cross officials 
indicate that from August 15 to November 15, a total of 19,322 cases were hospitalized. This 
figure does not include the additional thousands who were temporarily treated and sent away. 
During this period, 17,897 wounded soldiers were brought into the IC and FC. An additional 
1,425 civilian casualties collected from these two areas were admitted. 17  Altogether, an 
estimated 30,000 seriously injured soldiers were treated during the year at the 20 emergency 
hospitals opened for this purpose during the hostilities.18  
                                                 
11 The task of staffing, supplying and supporting hospitals was entrusted to the Wounded Soldiers Committee.  “Shanghai 
tackles relief problem”, Special Red Cross Supplement, 4 December 1937, p. 2. 
12 On the sanitary infrastructure in Shanghai, see Henriot, Christian & Zheng, Zu’an, Shanghai. Espace et représentations de 
1849 à nos jours (avec Zheng Zu'an), Paris, CNRS-Editions, 1999, pp. [X] 
13  This sad reality prevailed throughout the war and was one of the factors of demoralization among Chinese soldiers. 
Eastman, Lloyd E., Seeds of Destruction: China in War and Revolution, 1937-1945, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard U.P., 1984. 
14 “Remaking wounded soldiers,” Special Red Cross Supplement, 4 December 1937, p. 11 
15 The Red Cross hospitals were all close, save for one (I.R.C. Hospital for crippled soldiers) by August 1938. « Shanghai 
handles nearly 20,000 casualties, » Special Red Cross Supplement, 4 December 1937, p. 6; “Traffic in tragedy”, The China 
Weekly, 13 August 1938, p. 344 
16 « Shanghai handles nearly 20,000 casualties, » Special Red Cross Supplement, 4 December 1937, p. 7; « S.I.R.C. takes 
care of Shanghai refugees », The China Weekly, 26 February 1938, p. 360. 
17 « Shanghai handles nearly 20,000 casualties, » Special Red Cross Supplement, 4 December 1937, p. 6 
18  “Traffic in tragedy”, The China Weekly, 13 August 1938, p. 344 
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II. Refugees: a diverse and moving landscape 
 
The Chinese represented by far the bulk of the refugee population. Within this refugee 
population, however, there were various layers that can be defined in terms of resources, time, 
and geography. Furthermore, to gather a comprehensive view of the refugee situation, 
especially in the first six months of the Sino-Japanese conflict, it is also necessary to take into 
account other non-Chinese categories of population. In the present paper, I shall not develop 
this aspect. Yet, there were other categories of refugees that inevitably competed over time for 
scarce resources. By chronological order, there were three very different groups. The first one 
was the Jewish refugees. They form a separate group that had come from Germany and 
Central Europe to escape Nazi persecutions. Being a free port with no visa requirement, 
Shanghai had appealed to them as a port of last resort. They had arrived shortly before the 
beginning of the hostilities between Japan and China, relying on their own resources and 
competence, and on local charities and philanthropists to survive in their new environment. 
By the time the war began, a large number of them had not yet found a way to live on their 
own, especially elderly people. Throughout the early period of the war, some assistance came 
from outside, in particular from the United States. Those with no resources – around 2,600-
3,000 out of a total of 30,000 – were assembled in a camp. After the Japanese takeover of the 
city in 1941, this support was cut off. Furthermore, those who had no passport were required 
to move into a segregated area – often referred to as the “Hongkou ghetto” – as a measure of 
control. Yet, despite all the actual difficulties, this never constituted a camp similar to those 
established in Europe by the Nazis. As long as they had a job, the internees could move in and 
out of the ghetto. Those who had no job were confined inside and could only rely on the little 
assistance that came through from local Jewish merchants or on mutual help.19 In early 1942, 
around 5,000 were being fed daily, but another 3,000 were still in dire needs.20 Most managed 
to survive through the war. 
 
The Japanese were also concerned with the issue of becoming refugees, even if they were able 
to rely on resources made available by their authorities. On the one hand, a part of the quarters 
where they lived were included in the battlefield (Hongkou, Zhabei, Yangshupu).21 Numerous 
families had to leave their house and move south into the Japanese quarter in the International 
Settlement. Yet their fate was nothing compared to that of the Chinese families. The Japanese 
associations (Mindan, Renkokai) provided help and organized their installation. Soon 
thereafter, they were shipped back to Japan on vessels brought over by the Navy. The 
Japanese population decreased very substantially for several months, but most came back 
after the armed conflict came to a complete stop. Another wave of Japanese refugees hit the 
city later when fighting moved eastward and affected the cities of Central China. The 
Japanese consulates actually issued warnings and orders to leave. The Japanese residents of 
these cities naturally sought refuge in Shanghai, pending also their transfer back to Japan. 
Despite the difficulties, these families benefited from the support and logistics provided by 
                                                 
19 On the history of the Jewish immigrants from Germany and Central Europe, see Kreissler, Françoise, “Exil ou asile à 
Shanghai? Histoire des réfugiés d’Europe centrale (1933-1945)”, thèse d’Etat, Université Paris VIII, 2000, 3 vol.; Freyeisen, 
Astrid, Shanghai und die Politik des Dritten Reiches, Würzburg, Königshansen & Neumann, 2000. There is a large body of 
personal memoirs by former Jewish immigrants who went through this experience. See Krasno, Rena, Strangers always : A 
Jewish family in wartime, Berkeley, Pacific View, 1992; Carey, Arch, The war years at Shanghai, 1941-1945-1948, New 
York, Vantage Press, 1967.  
20  Shanghai Times, 14 January 1942, 15 January 1942, 5 February 1942.  
21 Henriot, Christian, “ Little Japan in Shanghai : An insulated community, 1875-1945 ” in Robert Bickers et Christian 
Henriot (eds.), New Frontiers : Imperialism's new communities in East Asia, 1842-1952, Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 2000, pp. 146-169. 
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the local associations.22 It must have been a difficult time for them to various degrees as they 
had to leave home, shops, jobs at once. Their well-planned removal from Shanghai, however, 
saved them from the traumas of war. 
 
The last category of “refugees” hardly concerns us here. The term “refugee” may not even 
entirely apply, although, to a certain extent, those concerned were made destitute within their 
own city, like the Chinese refugees, but without the trauma of war. The emergence of a new 
population of destitute residents among foreign nationals resulted from a deliberate policy by 
the Japanese authorities. Moreover, this policy targeted only the category labelled “enemy 
nationals” (British, Americans, Dutch and all citizens from the Allied countries involved in 
W.W.II). To curtail the power of the “enemy nationals” both materially and symbolically, the 
Japanese army imposed severe limitations on the amount of  money these residents could 
withdraw from banks. Increasingly, this measure of discrimination created the conditions for 
the development of another group of destitute residents. In early 1942, only a few hundred of 
these people required aid, but as months slipped by, their number increased. There were by 
then around 8,000 British and 2,000 Americans in the city.  The Shanghai American school 
was turned into relief quarters. The SMC prepared for the distribution of aid by setting up a 
special relief committee. Yet, this committee never took any action.23 In fact, the process of 
pauperization was halted by the Japanese themselves when they ordered the forced internment 
of all “enemy nationals” in closed camps. These camps constituted de facto “refugee camps” 
that relied on the resources provided by the Japanese military and the Red Cross.  While this 
experience was resented and recounted later by former inmates in very harsh terms, most 
internees benefited from conditions of detention far above what the Chinese refugees had 
experienced. It was a bitter experience, undoubtedly, especially for a population that was used 
to a privileged life, but apart from limited individual cases of ill treatment and tortures, most 
internees lived through the war. 
 
The last category of refugees that requires a mention is that of the Chinese that came from 
Central China. They form a specific cohort as many actually planned their move and belonged 
to well-off categories. In early spring 1938, a large number of rich refugees came to Shanghai, 
bringing with them money and movable wealth.24 It had various consequences. Of course, 
their arrival added to the pressure on local resources, especially in the competition for housing. 
At the same time, these “refugees” could take care of themselves and did not draw on the 
resources of public and private charities. On the opposite, the heavy concentration of capital 
in the city provided resources for an economic recovery at the end of 1938 and real estate 
boom the following year.25 
                                                 
22 Shanhai nihonjin kakuro rengokai no enkaku to jiseji (Evénements et évolution des associations de rue des Japonais à 
Shanghai), Shanghai, Shanhai nihonjin kakuro rengokai, 1939, p. 81 
23 Shanghai Times, 11 January 1942, 21 January 1942, 11 February 1942 
24 Barnett, Robert W., Economic Shanghai : Hostage to Politics, 1937-1941, New York, Institute for Pacific Relations, 1941, 
p. 128; Wu Chengxi, “Zhanhou shanghai jinrong biandong zhi yiban de qingxiang”, Jinrong daobao, vol 1, n° 1, march 1939, 
pp. 4-5 
25 Henriot, Christian, “ Shanghai industries during the Japanese occupation : Bombs, boom and bust (1937-1945) in In the 
Shadow of the Rising Sun. Shanghai under Japanese Occupation ed. by  Christian Henriot & Yeh Wen-hsin), 
Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 17-45. 
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a. Refugees: an essay in quantification 
 
Behind the term “refugee”, there was a vast array of very diverse situations. All these 
individuals had one thing in common: they were forced to abandon their home and to resettle 
elsewhere in the city. Although many were able to prepare their move, the large majority had 
to leave with little time and means to resettle. Quite many flew after having lost everything. 
Apart from the first category, these residents-turned-refugees were ill equipped to meet their 
new situation. For most of them the narrow margins of normal life and the sudden exodus 
from threatened homes had left no reserve for supplemental fruit or vegetable, no materials or 
opportunity for employment, no winter clothing and inadequate bedding. Their savings were 
limited and would be used up very quickly. Since about one million people moved into the 
foreign settlements under such circumstances, it is easy to realize the challenge that assisting 
such a large population represented. The massive exodus also presented obvious risks in terms 
of social unrest and sanitary conditions in the places where they concentrated. Early on, the 
authorities and above all the various native-place associations worked toward evacuating as 
many people as possible back to their villages. By December 1937, some 375,000 refugees 
had been evacuated from the city to their home provinces, but upwards of 700,000 still 
remained in the city, of which 140,000 were to be found in the camps and 250,000 in the 
Jacquinot Safety Zone.26  Obviously, even with the mobilization of all available resources, no 
organization could take care of such a large population.  
 
Refugees and the family system 
 
In fact, contemporary observers noted that a large majority of the refugees found solutions by 
themselves. Many thousand refugees were able to take care of themselves and found suitable 
accommodations with friends and relatives, or in hotels or places that they have been able to 
rent. Nevertheless, those who could afford to rent a new place were a minority in the human 
sea of refugees. Foreign observers actually realized with marvel that the problem of refugee 
relief was greatly facilitated by the saving features of the Chinese family system whereby any 
relation, no matter how distant is privileged and move in on more fortunate members of the 
family:27 “In this small Shanghai area alone, the maligned family system is responsible for 
maintaining the life of perhaps three quarters of a million people who would otherwise be 
starving.”28  And it meant something to receive parents or friends into one’s crowded quarters. 
Just in Central Shanghai district the population density already reached 400 to 550 persons 
per mu.29 It also meant giving up what little comfort and convenience people enjoyed. It 
meant distributing one’s not too ample food among double or triple the number of mouths. It 
meant sharing beds, and clothes, mats and utensils, and eventually even income.30  
 
It was estimated that in December 1937, 663,000 refugees lived upon the resources of friends 
and family. It was expected that rapidly dwindling resources would call for assistance to help 
carry these refugees through the winter months.31 In fact, this did not happen. By December, 
the maximum number of refugees assisted in camps was reached and, even if there was a 
turnover, the ranks of refugees initiated a slow but continuous decrease. A British intelligence 
                                                 
26  “Shanghai tackles relief problem”, Special Red Cross Supplement, 4 December 1937, p. 2. 
27 Decimal files, 102.81, 25 August 1937, NARA. 
28 “Chinese family system aids refugees,”  Special supplement of the “China Weekly review”, 4 December 1937, p. 4. 
29 On population density in Shanghai, see Henriot, Christian & Zheng, Zu’an, Shanghai. Espace et représentations de 1849 à 
nos jours (avec Zheng Zu'an), Paris, CNRS-Editions, 1999, pp. [X] 
30 “Chinese family system aids refugees,”  Special supplement of the “China Weekly review”, 4 December 1937, p. 4. 
31 “Shanghai launches Red Cross drive,”  Special supplement of the “China Weekly review”, 4 December 1937, p. 1. 
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reports stated that the situation was slowly returning to normal in February 1938. It observed: 
“the refugee situation is easing owing to deaths, enforced Japanese recruitment of able-
bodied males from the Nantao zone, and resumption of gardening around Shanghai.”32  
Indeed, even if other factors than those mentioned explain the decrease, it is true that refugees 
soon stopped to be perceived as a problem. After August 1938, official reports hardly 
mentioned refugees as a specific problem.33 The favorable evolution of the situation can be 
explained by various factors, including the resumption of economic activity and the 
progressive reopening of the occupied districts by the Japanese army (especially Zhabei, 
Hongkou and Yangshupu). Nevertheless, these measures came at a late date (end of 1938) and 
in between the survival of displaced persons relied mostly on the resources mobilized within 
the private circles of families. Even with debatable and contradictory figures, there is no 
doubt that around half a million Shanghainese survived through the first months of the war, 
up to more than a year, thanks to the support they received from their relatives or friends. 
 
Refugees on the streets 
 
Not all refugees were as fortunate, especially during the initial phase of the conflict. Those 
who had no family support, as a temporary emergency measure or out of sheer exhaustion, 
simply settled anywhere: “They overran the streets and huddled like pigs in sties in empty 
buildings, vacant lots, on window sills, in gutters and alleys. They sprawled for naps, nursed 
their babies, ate (when they could find or beg food) and lived their private life in public.”34 
No matter how many refuges were taken in and fed in refugee camps, thousands still 
remained without a place or sources from which to fill their rice bowl. Decayed buildings that 
should have been razed now housed their hundreds where once one or a few families lived. 
Every foot of space was occupied in some down-town office buildings that confronted rich 
window displays and rushing traffic. In a dark movie theater new audiences of these homeless 
and empty-handed make their beds between the narrow rows of seats.35 Scarcely better off 
were the incalculable throngs that crowd beyond belief street upon street of the poorer houses 
where the congestion, cost and strain drives out the weak as recruits for fresh camps and taxed 
hospitals.36 
 
The number of these truly shelterless refugees was estimated at 75,000 in December 1937, but 
the figure must have been higher.37 They represented the most pitiful lot of all. One witness 
recalls: “Two blocks north of Nanking road there is a little settlement of refugees. The shells 
of two business buildings house them. On mud floors are a few mats for beds. Locker space is 
a simply solved problem for there are few clothes to put in lockers. ... The children are bathed 
in the street... Adults take sponge baths if any... There are many such buildings together of the 
helpless who literally have no place to go and no work to do. The older ones stare off, dazed 
and weak. The younger, Chinese-fashion, make the best of what is at hand.” 38  The 
unregulated occupation of all sorts of unsuitable places throughout the foreign settlements 
presented a genuine challenge to the authorities. Whereas they could guarantee minimum 
levels of food and health protection in camps, the “street population” was fully beyond its 
reach and represented a potential threat for the health and safety of the other residents. 
Homeless and parentless young Chinese boys and girls were roaming the streets, huddling in 
                                                 
32 Intelligence report, 8 February 1938, F1699, 22083 Sino-Japanese war situation in Shanghai, FO371, PRO. 
33 1146, SMA 
34 “Traffic in tragedy”, The China Weekly, 13 August 1938, p. 344 
35  Boone, W.D., “Shanghai’s refugee problem”, China Quarterly, 3, 1, p. 62. 
36  Boone, W.D., “Shanghai’s refugee problem”, China Quarterly, 3, 1, p. 63. 
37  “Shanghai launches Red Cross drive,”  Special supplement of the “China Weekly review”, 4 December 1937, p. 1. 
38 “Traffic in tragedy”, The China Weekly, 13 August 1938, p. 344 
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doorways at night. There was a growing concern about these youngsters who found no other 
means to secure food than to steal it, cutting rice bags, snatching food from counters.39 It does 
not appear from the official records that there was a systematic policy of removing these 
refugees to camps, but the authorities monitored quite closely the areas where homeless 
refugees had congregated. A number of them must have found their way to refugee camps, 
but up to 1940 official records show the persistence of small pockets of homeless refugees.40 
 
Refugee camps and safety zone 
 
The massive arrival of refugees required emergency arrangements to accommodate them in 
surroundings with the minimum facilities for survival. The establishment of camps was 
initially the result of a proliferation of initiatives by all kinds of institutions and associations. 
The press noted that most conspicuous in mobilizing to help the shelterless refugees were the 
provincial guilds and the established benevolent societies.41 In a previous study, Feng Yi has 
shown that the native-place associations were indeed the main organizers of assistance to 
refugees, including their evacuation from the city, and the main financial supporters of the 
committees that eventually coordinated refugee assistance. Even after spring 1938, when the 
Red Cross eventually gave up the responsibility of funding refugee assistance, the task was 
taken over by a committee organized by the local elites, with the professional guilds and the 
native-place associations as the main agencies providing in turn the required funding.42 
Nevertheless, the organization of assistance to refugee was a task that mobilized all the 
official institutions, civic associations and numerous individuals. Faced with the proliferation 
of initiatives, a few major committees were establish to coordinate these efforts. They were 
the Shanghai International Relief Committee, the Federation of Shanghai Charity 
Organizations (Shanghai cishan tuanti lianhe jiuzaihui) and the Chinese municipality-
sponsored Refugee Relief Committee (Shanghai cishan tuanti lianhe jiuzaihui nanmin jiuji 
weiyuanhui43). The Shanghai International Red Cross was also very active, but it served only 
in a coordinating capacity and as a channel for collecting funding and material supply through 
its network abroad.  
 
The refugee camps in Shanghai were to be found on nearly every street, in places several in a 
single block and on a nearly very bit of ‘vacant’ land. The work of the authorities focused on 
reducing the number of camps, eliminating the less well-equipped ones, introducing and 
maintaining standards for food, health and housing. They also endeavored to carry out 
preventive medical work by vaccination against the most prevalent diseases such as cholera 
and smallpox. There was no dearth of volunteers among both Chinese and foreign residents. 
Thousands of Shanghai’s youth enlisted in the arduous and manifold tasks of these camps, 
living for the most part in these cheerless surroundings. Figures about refugees and camps 
vary across the sources, sometimes within the same document. The table provided by Feng Yi 
in her study of Shanghai refugees is so far the most reliable reconstruction. I have simply 
added census for additional periods collected from the SMC archives. 
 
                                                 
39 “Aid asked for Shanghai’s children,” The China Weekly, 1 October 1938, p. 150. 
40 « Appendix B. List showing number of poor refugees living on open spaces and in the empty houses of the settlement » in 
« List of  refugee camps in the International Settlement », revised February 2, 1940, 111-16-1036, SMA. 
41 “Shanghai tackles relief problem”, Special Red Cross Supplement, 4 December 1937, p. 2. 
42 Feng, Yi, « Elites locales et solidarités régionales. L’aide aux réfugiés à Shanghai (1937-1940), » Etudes chinoises, XV, no 
1-2, 1996, pp.  92-93 
43 Its name notwithstanding, the committee was independent from the Federation with which it shared the same name. See 
Feng, Yi, « Elites locales et solidarités régionales. L’aide aux réfugiés à Shanghai (1937-1940), » Etudes chinoises, XV, no 
1-2, 1996, pp.  90-91. 
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Table 1 
 
Number of refugee camps and refugees 
in the Shanghai foreign settlements (1937-1944) 
 
Date 
International 
Settlement   
French 
Concession   Total 
  IS camps IS refugees FC camps FC refugees   
15/08/1937     13 13200   
30/08/1937 105 52106 47 27230 79336 
09/09/1937 147 60595       
23/09/1937 121 61896       
28/10/1937 129 72447 35 23800 96247 
11/11/1937 132 73191 46     
02/12/1937 153 93269       
06/12/1937 158 95336       
14/12/1937 154 91597 40 25900 117497 
01/02/1938     27 18735   
01/04/1938     24 17000   
01/06/1938 62 40000       
23/10/1938 87 54771 39 27102 81873 
07/11/1938     6 10146   
29/12/1938 75 53922       
01/02/1939 64 52153       
20/06/1939     14 18313   
04/10/1939 36 39073       
01/04/1940     2 400   
02/02/1940 20 19774     19774 
01/06/1940   18031       
01/10/1940   16396       
18/12/1940 14 14764     14764 
03/01/1941 14 15185     15185 
15/08/1941 13 13108     13108 
05/01/1942 12 11955     11955 
01/10/1942 7 2238     2238 
01/12/1943 7 2169     2169 
01/02/1943 8 2154     2154 
01/03/1943 8 1887     1887 
01/12/1943 6 1516     1516 
01/02/1944 7 1668     1668 
01/09/1944 6 1353     1353 
 
 
The highest number of camps (161) was recorded in December 1937, although they housed 
only 97,000 refugees.44  Yet another source gives 137,000 refugees in camps at the end of 
November 1937, with an equal number in the Jacquinot Safety Zone.45 One contemporary 
participant even claims “approximately 256,000 refugees, in about 200 camps and with 
thousands of even more pitifully situated, who from choice or necessity are living in the 
streets, in alley or doorways.”46 The largest “camp” was the Jacquinot Safety Zone that 
                                                 
44 Note, PHD, December 1937. 
45 Boone, W.D., “Shanghai’s refugee problem”, China Quarterly, 3, 1, p. 62. 
46  Nagler, Etha M., “The problem of food and shelter for refugees in Shanghai”, China Quarterly, 3, 1, p. 67. 
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opened on 9 November 1937, after an agreement was reached between its initiators and the 
Chinese and Japanese military authorities. The purpose was to offer a place of safety for the 
civilian population. It covered a good third of the former walled city, next to the French 
Concession. It was managed by an international committee, the actual policing being 
entrusted to Chinese merchants. It received between 225,000 and 250,000 persons, with one 
half totally destitute.47 As such, the Jacquinot initiative was an innovation that was repeated 
some time later in Nanking (although it did not prevent the massive massacre of civilians for 
which Nanking remains infamous in history).  
 
While most refugees came in groups, especially as families, some were alone, or got lost, etc. 
Special refuges were established for the aged who had been bereaved of kin or hopelessly 
separated in the mass migration.48 There were homes for deserted or lost children, orphanages 
and nurseries for wartime babies who have been deserted. In August 1938, 1,500 orphans 
were taken care of in nine camps specially engaged in accommodating refugee children.49 
There were also camps for defectives and those maimed by war. Some received only young 
women, the natural prey of every exploiter.50 Obviously, war exposed much more those who 
were alone, or under-aged, or physically weak or handicapped. Whereas they could rely on 
kins, friends or neighbors in normal times, these protections just crumbled in times of 
emergencies. They were left over or lost on the way. 
 
The number of refugees in camps remained high until February 1938 with 100,000 in the 
International Settlement, 50,000 in the French Concession and 75,000 in the Nantao Safety 
Zone.51 Thereafter, the ranks of refugees started to melt, although the process was offset by 
refugees from outside Shanghai. As we shall see below, there was a growing concern among 
the authorities that a part of the refugee population would rest satisfied with a regime of 
public assistance. Active measures were taken to send away refugees and close camps. In 
September 1939, 30 camps in operation with 39,077 refugees (and 6 Jewish refugee camps 
with 2,612 refuges).52 By early 1940, the number of refugees had come to a small percentage 
of the original population (around 10%) but it continued to weigh on the local resources. In 
fact, it seems that a level was reached – around 15,000 -- that was difficult to break through. 
Without individual data, it is impossible to assess who these refugees were, but some of them 
must have turned into “professional” refugees. The decline and quasi disappearance of 
refugee camps was precipitated by the Japanese invasion in December 1941. The blockade 
that resulted from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the extreme difficulties with food 
supply during the winter of 1941-1942 and the explicit policy by the Japanese military to get 
rid of the camps lead the organizations in charge of refugees to close down the camps. 
Actually, a small number remained (6) that accommodated those who were unfit to be left on 
the street. 
 
Refugees did not represent a stable population. The management of camps was made more 
difficult by the constant move of refugees in and out of the camps. One report indicates that 
the overall rate of turnover was 1,4, though with large differences among the six camps 
concerned (from 0,5 to 2,8). The same applies to the rate of monthly turnover that could be 
marginal (10-14%) or tremendous (130%). The highest number of new arrivals took place in 
November, when the cold weather started to set in and when refugees who had lived on their 
                                                 
47 Shanghai handles nearly 20,000 casualties, » Special Red Cross Supplement, 4 December 1937, p. 9 
48 Boone, W.D., “Shanghai’s refugee problem”, China Quarterly, 3, 1, p. 64. 
49 China Press, 27 August 1938. 
50  Boone, W.D., “Shanghai’s refugee problem”, China Quarterly, 3, 1, p. 64. 
51 Intelligence report, 8 February 1938, F1699, 22083 Sino-Japanese war situation in Shanghai, FO371, PRO. 
52 SMC and FC health report, September 1939, Consular trade report, 1939. 
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reserves had used them up.53 Then the rate tended to decline to 1,23, showing a decline in the 
number of new entries.54 Over a period of six months in 38 camps, statistics show that after 
the mass arrival of the beginning, between 60 to 300 persons moved in and out every month.55 
On average, camps offered better conditions than plain installation in alleyways or old 
buildings. Yet there were considerable differences that the Red Cross and the International 
Relief Committee endeavored to reduce by closing the least viable camps or by regrouping 
the inmates in better-equipped camps. Despite these efforts, the situation remained far from 
ideal. One writer describes his visit to one of them: “at the other extreme is the Sinza road 
camp. Jam-packed into two rows of houses with an alleyway between, the refugees live – or 
exist – in a welter of dirt, refuse and smelly humanity. In hallways so dark you can’t see your 
footing you stumble into a child mother nursing her baby.”56  
 
b. Categories of refugees 
 
People did not choose to become refugees. War dawned on Shanghai residents across social 
classes, even if the more well off, as mentioned above, moved earlier than the rest of the 
population. The population of refugees should therefore reflect the structure of the population 
in the districts affected by war. In fact, the first thing to be said is that it is extremely difficult 
to apprehend the refugees. The historian can only rely on official records that were held very 
unevenly and used different and often very broad categories. Our data is therefore uneven and 
fragmentary, but it offers a glimpse into the refugee population, at least that of the camps. 
Quite clearly, certain categories were far more represented in this population than their actual 
share of the Shanghai population. 
 
Age 
 
It is often impossible to make serious estimates. Even the most distant categories are easily 
mixed, for instance men and women, handicapped and orphans. The orphans and the 
handicapped have no age or sex in most statistical records. They counted only as “mouths”. 
The children are categorized as below and above 6 years, but have no sex. Again, what they 
ate was more important than who they were. This makes statistical reconstructions quite 
problematic. In one report, out of a total of  35,675 refugees, 21,787 were counted as adults 
(61%) to which the category “old persons” (1,060, or 3%) should be added. One cannot fail to 
note the very low percentage of “old persons”, even if the age limit is not indicated. By usual 
Chinese statistical standards of the time, this would mean above 60. This segment of the 
population represented a higher percentage in normal conditions. Children represented 11,726 
individuals (33%). We can safely assume that the 490 orphans (1%) were also children.57  In 
most reports, children appear in great numbers, averaging a third of the refugee population. 
This is very striking. In some cases, they even represent the overwhelming majority. In camp 
no. 1 of the SIRC, statistics categorized children as “little babies (5%), “children (21,6%) and 
“student age” (24,2%). In this camp, adults were subcategorized as 30,7% for “adults” and 
18,5% for “aged”.58 In camp no. 3, those aged less than 18 represented 57%. Those aged 50 
                                                 
53   Shanghai guoji jiujihui liu ge yue baogao, 1937.8-1938.2  (Six-month report of the Shanghai International Relief 
Committee), , Shanghai, Shanghai guoji jiujihui , 1938, p. 57. 
54  Shanghai guoji jiujihui nianbao (Annual report of the Shanghai International Relief Committee), Shanghai guoji jiujihui 
nianbao, 1937.8-1938.8,  Shanghai, Shanghai guoji jiujihui p. 20. 
55  Shanghai cishan tuanti lianhehui jiuji zhanhou nanmin weiyuanhui ban nian gongzuo baogao no. 2, 1938, 3-8  (Half-year 
report of the Committee for war refugees of the Federation of Charity Organizations), March-August 1938, pp. 24-27. 
56  “Traffic in tragedy”, The China Weekly, 13 August 1938, p. 344 
57 Shanghai cishan tuanti lianhehui jiuji zhanhou nanmin weiyuanhui ban nian gongzuo baogao, p. 31. 
58 Shanghai guoji jiujihui liu ge yue baogao, p. 50. 
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and above were a mere 9%.59 There were 40,000 children below age 14 in all refugee camps 
in August 1938.60 A few months later, in the 105 camps under the supervision of the S.I.R.C., 
there was a total of 24,700 children below 14 years of age.61 
 
Sex 
 
In most records, the sex distribution among refugees fails to reflect the rate that prevailed in 
the population at large in Shanghai where men outnumbered women. In a 1938 report, men 
represented 58% and women 42% (or 139 men for 100 women).62 Yet in another table in the 
same report, adult women (10,832) appeared to be as numerous as men (10,855). Since the 
difference came from the “others” category that, in the second table, point to the “children” 
category, one may assume that the sex balance among children was skewed toward boys.63  In 
another report for the first six months of the war, men were slightly underrepresented (5,859) 
compared to women (6,597), but we have no breakdown by sex for children (6,613).64 Over a 
year in the six camps of the Shanghai International Relief Committee, adult women were 
slightly more numerous (33,7%) than men (30,5%), with children representing 35,8%.65 In 
camp no. 3, we have a detailed table by sex and age. Of the 1,320 inmates, there was a clear 
majority of women (56%), especially in the 20-39-year age bracket (70%). Girls were also far 
more numerous than boys.66 It is difficult to generalize from partial data and uneven situations 
in the various camps, but one gets the sense that women were overrepresented among the 
refugee population. Camps may have been viewed as a place where women and children 
could find some comfort while men looked for resources, work, etc. outside. 
 
Profession 
 
The statistics on the profession of refugees were registered in very broad categories. In a 1938 
report, the population was simply divided into workers (24%), peasants (23%), merchants 
(6%), students (9%) and others (37%). Students must have been children while the “others” 
category may simply reflect failure in proper registration).67 Another reports broke down its 
refugee population into workers (47,9%), farmers (13,8%), petty vendors (8,0%), students 
(7,9%), merchants (7,6%), and no occupation (14,8%). Yet in the camp next door, the 
distribution was completely different, with a majority of farmers (52%) and a large number of 
petty vendors (20%).68 In other words, depending on the way statistics were drawn up and on 
the location of the camp, or on the timing of the arrival of the refugees, the distribution by 
profession varied greatly. On the whole, however, most refugees came from the ranks of the 
xiao shimin (small urbanites or the peasantry around Shanghai). The number of students is 
especially high, but this may be due to the high concentration of students in Shanghai whose 
universities were turned into refugee camps or simply destroyed and evacuated. As many 
came from places outside Shanghai, they could not rely on family to help them. It is also 
interesting to note that those with professional qualifications were few in the camps. A census 
of the qualified workers available in the six SICR camps revealed a total of 633 individuals 
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with professions ranging from tailor to carpenter, weaver, mason, brass smith, thread maker, 
printer, cobbler, cotton mill hand, cigarette roller.69 
 
Native place 
 
There is no surprise in observing that the largest share of the refugee originated from the 
neighboring provinces. Jiangsu came first with 47%, followed by Zhejiang with 30%. In fact, 
this reflected largely the composition of the Shanghai population. Guangdong, Anhui, Fujian, 
and Hubei represented respectively 2,8%, 2,6%, 2,1% and 2,0%. The rest came from all over 
China.70 Nevertheless, the geographical origin does not tell much about the actual place of 
living of those concerned. In fact, in a report about refugees during the first six months after 
the hostilities broke out, we get a better sense of the actual home of the refugees. In camp no. 
1, for instance, the distribution was: Zhabei (25,5%), Baoshan (21,5%), Yanshupu (17,3%), 
Nantao (8,8%), Pudong (7,4%), Dachang (6,7%), Hongkou (6,6%), Jiangwan (3,5%), 
Wusong etc. (2,7%).71 In the annual report by the same institution, a survey of three camps 
shows varying proportions among groups from the same region, but the trend remains the 
same. When detailed statistics are provided, it usually becomes very clear that refugees were 
mostly former residents of Shanghai.72 This establishes clearly that all these refugees lived in 
the city or its immediate vicinity where fighting took place.  
 
c. Closing down refugee camps 
 
There was a sharp increase in the number of refugees in the months that followed the outbreak 
of the hostilities. Thereafter, the trend went slowly downward as can bee seen from the 
population in the six camps of the Shanghai International Relief Committee.73 Refugees did 
not relish to stay in camps. In fact, a large number left voluntarily once they had found a place 
to live or a way to leave the city. In the six camps of the Shanghai International relief 
Committee, 38,946 persons left (out of a total of 65,000 refugees) on their own, while 4,798 
were repatriated to their native places.74 
 
As early as February 1938, the Shanghai Red Cross was attempting partial liquidation of the 
refugee situation by collecting scattered craftsmen, finding space and materials for work, and 
markets for products.75 It had started a work-relief project several months ago that it now tried 
to push with increasing energy. Yet, this could not solve the problem of self-support. Only 
two hundred refugees were enlisted and 85% of them were women. 76  It was finding 
increasingly difficult to raise enough funds to support the large refugee population. In May 
1938, it launched a new drive to raise one million dollars to support the remaining 170,000 
refugees.77 The director of the Shanghai International Red Cross came to the conclusion that 
the relief system was beginning to produce the same undesirable effects that the “dole” 
system did in the U.S. during the depth of America’s depression. He therefore recommended 
drastic reforms in the local relief administration in order to prevent charity from becoming a 
serious demoralizing factor in the habits of the city’s refugees. He suggested to classify camps 
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into three categories: housing camps, half-ration camps and full-ration camps. Refugees had 
to be sorted out and sent to the camps of the appropriate classifications.78 It does not seem that 
this plan was ever implemented, since the Red Cross ran out of money and let the local 
Chinese associations take over. Yet, it was the sign that popular perception of the refugees 
was changing. 
 
Owners of real estate properties eventually expressed their discontent to the authorities about 
the continued occupation of their premises by refugees. This also increased the pressure to 
close the camps and evacuate the refugees.79 Between April and August 1938, the Shanghai 
Federation of Charity Organizations (Shanghai cishan tuanti lianhehui)  closed down eleven 
camps. 80  After a while, the local authorities increasingly resented the presence of idle 
population in refugee camps as a burden. In January 1939, the FC was making preparations to 
close most of the camps in its territory and to concentrate the refugees in a few large camps. 
The process was due to be completed in April 1939.81 The Jacquinot zone was closed at the 
end of June 1939. The 19,000 refugees who still occupied the area were given a month of 
food supply and dismissed. The liquidation of the zone was due to the departure of Father 
Jacquinot to France, to difficulties in supplying food to the refugees and to the protests of the 
legitimate owners of the houses where the refugees had been accommodated.82 
 
The brigadier-general of the Salvation Army announced in April 1940 that he planned 
tentatively to liquidate all refugee camps by the end of the month. He estimated that 75% of 
the inhabitants of the camps, totaling 30,000 to 35,000 (of whom 20,000 in Salvation Army 
camps) would probably find a place and work. A fairly large number of them would also 
make their appearance on the streets and, if so, those turning into beggars should be collected 
and placed in one large camp. The time had come for these refugees to fight for themselves. 
“It was only legitimate for the working population of Shanghai that this matter of refugee 
relief should be liquidated, for some of the poor had lived for two and a half years in those 
camps where they had been provided with food, lodging, clothing, education, and 
hospitalization.”  The Brigadier-general feared that public criticism was bound to increase if 
no action was taken.83 
 
By 1942, when the Japanese starts to impose the implementation of a system of population 
control (baojia) and food rationing, the authorities of the IC moves more decidedly to close 
all the remaining camps. Facing a situation of food scarcity, and lacking the means to obtain 
support from the Japanese army, the charities that had provided support so far can no longer 
secure enough funds. There remained around 11,151 refugees citywide in various camps, with 
one half in the three northern sub-districts. The planned closing of a large refugee camp on 
North Chekiang Road means throwing the 4,193 inmates upon the public. In fact, by the mid-
March 1942, 1,782 persons had already been dismissed with a little money in their pocket. 
The remaining 2,407 inmates were about to be dismissed, even a group of 200 cripples and 
500 orphans. The same situation prevailed in the other camps – one with 660 inmates and one 
with 4,083 inmates. Altogether, 2,228 persons were totally helpless and required urgent action 
before their dismissal from the camps.84 
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III. Managing the refugee camps  
 
The establishment and organization of close to 200 camps in a matter of weeks, in a city that 
was overwhelmed by a massive human wave of a million people, was a formidable challenge 
despite the know how that past experiences provided, especially the capacity for immediate 
mobilization of the Chinese native-place associations. They were initially the main actors to 
which higher-level organs such as the Red Cross or the SIRC tried to bring better coordination, 
supplementary resources and sets of rules for running the camps. 
 
a. Ordering and regulating 
 
In the initial phase of the establishments of the camps, there was no set system of survey and 
distribution. An exhaustive investigation was made and considerable, overlapping and waste 
was found. Charts were prepared for managers of camps to fill in. This was the basis for the 
requisitions for food, clothing, etc. to be made by camp managers. Each refugee had a number 
and it became easier to check actual requirements when itemized requisitions were 
presented.85 The SIRC observed the uneven situation among refugee camps. It organized a 
Visiting committee for the sole purpose of alleviating the camp problems and improving the 
conditions in which the refugees lived. The duties of the committee were to make 
observations and inquiries in the essential matters in the camps and any necessary correction 
or improvement in camp problems was immediately communicated top the camp’s supporting 
society or guild for enforcement.86 The Visiting committee drew up a tentative “brochure” 
both in English and Chinese governing the organization of the camps and started on foot a 
movement for training the camp managers.87 After a few weeks of improvisation that the 
situation dictated, a better sense of order was achieved with the adoption of common rules and 
installation of basic facilities in almost all camps. 
 
Order and mutual helpfulness prevail despite bleak misery. Most of the camp labor and many 
and varied projects were willingly undertaken by the refugees themselves (construction, 
cooking, cleaning, etc.). Yet this represented an activity for few. Most refugees had to spend 
long idle hours in confined quarters. They were not strictly “interned”. The privilege of taking 
leave of absence prevailed in practically all the camps, but the police, for fear of interference 
with traffic, forbade the refugees to walk in the streets in large numbers. They were allowed 
to go out between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. for fresh air and walking exercise.88  
 
There were cases of regulation breach, however. Living in such conditions could hardly create 
an ideal environment. On the whole, however, the number and nature of offences remained 
unimportant. In one camp, there were 382 cases in six months among a population of 6,000 
people. One third of the offences was represented by smoking (102), followed by food 
secreting (72), quarrelling (62), fighting (42). The rest covered “late return”, property damage, 
water robbing, cigarette secreting, and stealing. In an even larger camp (26,000), registered 
offences amounted to 218 and covered spitting (95), quarrelling (76) and food secreting 
(47).89 In other words, discipline was well maintained in camps. Even in a large concentration 
like the Jacquinot safety zone, order was imposed by strict rules and military-like peace-
keeping militia. 
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b. Feeding, sheltering and clothing 
 
Feeding was of course the biggest challenge. For the organizations involved in helping the 
refugees, it represented on average two thirds of their expenses.90 But the challenge was not 
just the problem of cost. There were three intertwined issues in feeding the refugees:  
 
- supply of food: since Shanghai was cut off from its hinterland and from overseas 
markets, the stocks available in the city were depleted very quickly as war drew on for 
three months. When fighting moved inland, the issue was solved thanks to imports, 
but over time the cost of maintaining a population of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees was staggering. Just over six months, the SIRC served more than 5,5 million 
meals. Even when kept at a very low rate, the total cost was enormous. Although the 
cost of feeding in the better refugee camps has not averaged more than ten cents (U.S. 
$0.03) per day per person, when measured by the hundred thousand and by months of 
days it becomes a staggering demand.91 
- distribution of food: It was not just enough to gather staples, vegetables, etc. The 
primary foodstuffs had to turned into meals. It required workers, but above all 
appropriate facilities and equipment. In the beginning, many camps lacked the basic 
facilities and served minimal rations of rice. This poor diet was the most direct cause 
of diseases among refugees. One way to solve this issue was the establishment of 
“central kitchens” from where meals were dispatched to the various camps where no 
facilities existed. This called for the mobilization of a whole fleet of trucks that ran 
across the city. At every step, the managers were confronted with problems of  
“leakages” that they tried to keep a low level. 
- diet: as camp managers discovered soon, filling up one’s belly was not enough. A 
great care had to be paid to the nature of the food itself, especially in terms of vitamins, 
fibers, etc. The delivery of plain rice gruel proved erroneous and inflicted damages 
that could cost refugees their life. This issue is detailed below. 
 
As supplies have become more and more unattainable and costly, most of the refugee camps 
have been able to provide only wheat flour, cooked as steam bread, in many instances but 
once a day and as the sole form of food. With little or no vitamins, this unaccustomed diet has 
brought on wide scale illness or lack of resistance to illness beyond the scope of the burdened 
medical corps.92 The inadequate nutrition of refugees has led to the development of various 
diseases, especially Beri-Beri 93 . Many of these are of the severe, acute type, requiring 
expensive medicine for treatment. Practically all the patients have developed the disease 
during their stay in the refugee camps. Skin infections and eye infections are also commonly 
seen in the camps.94 
 
A second issue was that of babies and children, and their mothers. They could not be fed with 
rice or wheat and camp organizers raised the issue of securing milk to children, nursing 
mothers and the sick. This concern was met to some degree, though not adequately, by 
supplying bean milk. By the end of 1937, 15,000 lbs. of bean milk per day were being 
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provided for 15,000 children under six years of age.95  The SIRC was able to produce 128,560 
lbs. of soya bean milk over two months that were distributed to 50 refugee camps.96 The 
supply of bean milk helped tide over the most urgent problems and to alleviate the needs of 
children in camps. Yet, as we shall see below, children remained the most exposed victims 
among the refugee population. 
 
For shelter refugees made do with whatever they could to avail themselves of, especially 
when the weather started to turn colder. Condemned, leaking, unsanitary or half-built building, 
hastily erected, mat-sheds, – anything, anywhere, providing shelter for as many people as 
could possibly crowd in – have been used, as well as some vacant, well-built structures, 
schools, universities, dwellings, temples, theaters and churches.97  Almost all the empty lots 
on the border of the International Settlement near Caojiadu were covered with straw and 
bamboo huts of a more rudimentary type than existed before the war. These huts housed 
mostly workers from the plants that have moved or reopened in the area.98 In regard to 
squatter huts, there was a marked difference between refugee camps and squatter huts.  The 
inhabitants of the latter were in the main more or less self-supporting, whereas the inhabitants 
of the refugee camps were practically destitute. It is more than probable that a population of 
150,000 occupied these huts and in fact counted among those who found a solution by 
themselves to resettle in the foreign settlements. Despite the complaints by the local residents, 
mostly British, the SMC Public Health Department remained reluctant to send them away, 
even if authority was obtained and the necessary force supplied to evict them.99 Of course, the 
authorities preferred the formally organized camps of the various charity organizations, but 
had to accept the inevitable. The more so as there was a shortage of straw, bamboo and 
matting of which there was a great need for erecting camps. Finally, to improve these hastily 
put up shelter, the charity organizations used all means. Large donations of posters were 
received from the advertisement departments of big firms and were sued to paper the inside 
walls of mat sheds as protection against cold winds.100 Refugees could therefore live in a 
basic and often rudimentary shelter while enjoying the view of the most fashionable consumer 
products on their walls. The housing market was depleted only for a while. During 1939, 
Shanghai experienced the most extensive building activity of any of the cities of China, but it 
was confined in the foreign settlements. Much of this new building was to replace that were 
destroyed during the hostilities and to meet the greatly increased demand arising from the 
influx of higher class Chinese refugees.101 
 
War began at the end of the summer but fighting continued well into the end of the autumn. 
When winter set in, all the refugees were still in the settlements, with no hope of returning to 
their homes, if they still existed. As most refugees had left in haste, almost none of them was 
equipped to meet the cold winter weather, even in a place like Shanghai. The issue was 
addressed by a Clothing committee, appointed by the Chinese Medical Association, to take 
charge of the donations of old clothes and organize their distribution to the refugees. From 
three women sorting old clothing, it eventually grew to more than two hundred workers.102 
Altogether, a limited amount of resources was devoted to clothing. From the records of the 
Shanghai International relief Committee, it appears that only 12,6% of the expenses were 
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made on clothing.103  Apart from local donations, the largest shipments of clothing were 
received from Hong Kong and Singapore. Unfortunately, most of the clothing received were 
for summertime and had to be patched together to be turned into “winter” clothing.104 The 
tedious work of sewing, padding, etc. had to be organized. There was an obvious large pool of 
workforce among refugees to do this job. Yet, because there was a risk of transmission of 
disease, it was not possible to ask women in one refugee camp to sew for those in other camps. 
The women who were employed were really refugees but were living in houses with friends 
or relatives. They received only a nominal sum for their work.105 Yet the issue of clothing was 
just a one-time necessity. While a person must go on eating every day, once he has a warm 
suit of clothing, even if hardly fashionable, it would last for a whole season and even longer. 
 
c. Treating and dying 
 
Even in normal conditions, a population requires medical care. The concentration of a large 
number of destitute population in unsanitary conditions, with insufficient food was a cause for 
the development of various diseases. A great demand was made at the time on all hospitals 
because of the large number of wounded refugees and soldiers pouring into these institutions. 
Apart from the difficulties that arose form the fighting and made maritime relations more 
difficult and risky, the supply of drugs and medical supplies faced a particular situation. On 
the one hand, such supplies were inadequately stocked in the city and they were soon drawn 
up as soon as the fighting began. Because of the Japanese naval blockade, foreign ships, 
especially American and Canadian, no longer called at Chinese ports. Furthermore, re-
supplying could not be done relying on pharmaceutical companies because various materials 
for medical care were highly volatile or explosive (alcohol, ether, etc.) and were not ordered 
by them. Some were officially a government monopoly (narcotics).  The organization of 
supply was taken up by the Chinese medical association that accredited agents all over the 
world and established four collecting offices overseas. Eventually, medical supplies were 
shipped to Hong Kong and, from there, to four main centers, including Shanghai.106 
 
The shifting of the fighting area away from Shanghai after November changed the situation 
and the gifts of medical supplies from abroad eased the situation, but for three months the 
medical staff had to work with limited amounts of medicine to meet the huge demand of war, 
for both wounded soldiers and the civilian population. 
 
The question of sanitation in refugee camps was not tackled by the SIRC until the end of 
December as sanitation was primarily the responsibility of the municipal authorities. The task 
of surveying the medical situation, making recommendations to the authorities and organizing 
medical care was taken over by the Chinese Medical Association. The Shanghai International 
Red Cross had no medical technical staff to help. It provided money.107 The medical staff 
engaged both in preventive and curative work. On the preventive side, they worked toward 
the extension of delousing work and bathing facilities in refugee camps. They also made 
recommendations for diet in the camps. To assist the limited medical staff, refugee girls 
received a training to care for the sick in the camps.108 Whenever a camp was established, the 
refugees were vaccinated within 24 hours. This also applied to new arrivals to the existing 
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camps.109 Yet, despite all the efforts, vaccination never covered the whole refugee population. 
In the six camps of the Shanghai International relief Committee, 35,722 individuals were 
treated against a total of 61,350.110 In May 1938, there was an outbreak of cholera, that 
reached its maximum in August, but the epidemic remained under control. Altogether, there 
were 3,120 cases, with 372 deaths. Vaccination was implemented extensively among the 
refugees.111 
 
On the curative side, the emphasis was placed on both supporting existing refugee clinics and 
forming new ones as demand required. Support was given in the form of medical supplies 
based on the size of the population in each camp. These clinics were also inspected on a 
regular basis. By the end of December, there were 19 camp clinics (82,000 inmates) and 9 
mobile clinics (reaching 65 camps with a population of 58,000). It was estimated that 10% of 
the population required medical treatment.112 In general, the sick in the camps were adverse to 
being examined by the doctors or entering hospitals; they preferred to stay in beds in the 
camps. 113  Hospitals would easily admit contagious cases, but sometimes the mothers 
themselves – such as during the epidemic of measles that killed hundreds of children – would 
rather have their children die in their arms than to have them removed from their care.114  In 
the Jacquinot Zone, eight clinics and hospitals were established to meet the needs of the 
250,000 refugees, but after the takeover of the area by the Japanese army on 15 December, the 
work of the clinics was greatly reduced.115 Medical assistance was also provided through 
support to the established civilian hospitals. They were not the main instruments to take care 
of refugee needs since they had to bear the brunt of both the bombings that had suddenly 
increased the number of casualties and of an increase in refugee patients. An ambulance 
service and a hospital admission office was also established to sort out and facilitate the 
admission of sick refugees to hospitals. 
 
In a population of  61,350, there were 41,258 cases of “slight ills” over a year and 3,131 cases 
of “serious illness”.116  In refugee clinic no. 2, over a period of six months, a total of 3575 
patients were admitted. Men formed the largest contingent (2,240), followed by women (937) 
and children (398). An average of 30% came out completely cured, while one half was still in 
treatment in the clinic. A small number walked out or was transferred to other establishments. 
Between 10% and 15% died. The proportions were practically the same in clinic no. 1.117 In 
the S.I.R.C. refugee hospital, 2976 persons were treated. The largest number was cured (1497) 
or partly cured (609), but there were 726 deaths (close to a quarter).118 Going to hospital was 
definitely not a good sign. The age distribution of the patients was skewed toward the younger 
ones, with 19% between 1 and 9 years and 16% between 10 and 19 years.119  In refugee camp 
no. 5, established in Jiaotong University, more than 17,000 people were accommodated. 
Between 15 November 1937 and February 1938, the small hospital that was erected received 
16,963 patients. On average, every day, close to 200 patients were admitted. In the meantime, 
163 babies were born (three every two days), though over six months the average was one per 
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day.120  In the six camps of the Shanghai International Relief Committee, there were 280 new 
births over a year (total population 61,350).121 
 
People died in numbers among the refugees. It is impossible to come up with general figures. 
Only those living in camps were counted and even in this case, the figures are scattered in 
various reports. Going to hospital was certainly a chance to get properly treated, but it was 
also a sign that the illness was serious. In two refugee clinics, a total of 818 persons died over 
six month out of a total of 6,658, or 12%.122  In the first six months (August 1937-January 
1938), in the six camps taken care of by the Shanghai International Relief Committee, 2,135 
individuals died in an average population of 19,100 (or 11%).123 Sex made no difference. 
There were as many male as women. In the following six months, only 506 persons died.124 
Of the 2,135 individuals who died in the six camps, 52% were under 6 years and 8% had 
between 6 and 14 years. 125  Undoubtedly, war took its toll on children through disease. 
Measles and dysentery represented 42% and 16% of the causes of death respectively. 126 In 
another report, dysentry came first (25%), followed by pneumonia (21,2%) and acute interitis 
(13,3%). Measles came fourth (6,6%).127 The death rate of the Shanghai Emergency Relief 
Committee (same as SIRC?) camps was 33,35 per thousand.128 
 
Infant mortality is very high among the refugee population. According to the National Child 
Welfare Association of China, during the period covering August 1937 to May 1938, it has 
reached the appalling figure of 62,395 (41,746 in the International Settlement and 19,620 in 
the French Concession). The major causes are the lack of sanitary arrangements, insufficient 
nourishment and spread of various diseases.129  The PHD of the International Settlement 
contested this figure. For the ten months concerned, the PHD found 31,406 dead children, 
including all those who were found in the streets of the IC and extra-settlement area. Basing 
his calculation on the average population of the camps (77,780), with an average of one third 
of children, the total would be 25,986, far below the numbers given by the National Child 
Welfare Association of China130. Yet all figures pointed to a high death toll among children. 
In camp no. 3 and no. 6 of the SIRC, the percentage or children was 77% and 79% of the 
registered deaths respectively.  The North China Daily News found the figure quite reasonable: 
a death toll of 225 per thousand “is not considered excessive in this country.”131 
 
d. Educating and training 
 
For the sake of both preventing a loss in education for the children and to avoiding a situation 
of complete idleness, the refugee camps endeavored to organize a system of education for the 
young  as well as for the adults. For the former, it took the form of classes organized on a 
more limited scale than usual – basically two to three hours a day132 – with existing materials, 
wherever there was enough space to establish a school. One of the keen problems was to 
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provide desks and chairs. Often, they were replaced by stiff cardboard that the children placed 
on their knees while they seated on biscuit tins as stools. Teaching was dispensed by 
volunteers, especially teachers who were in the refugee camps. By December, schools had bee 
created in 205 camps and served 27,948 children, but 39 camps with about 5,000 children still 
had no provision for education.133 In the 46 camps under the care of the Shanghai  Federation 
of Charity Organizations, an average of 7,500-8,000 individuals attended classes between 
March and August 1938, with children representing more than one half. Yet, this is to be 
compared to the totazl adult population (more than 20,000) and school-age children (8,515). 
Obviously, even for the latter, quite a large number was excluded from any education.134 
 
A similar though more limited effort was made to provide education to refugees, especially to 
the illiterate ones. This was a way to keep they busy and offer them an opportunity to learn 
something. It consisted of lectures, physical exercises, moving pictures (hygiene) and story-
telling.135 A more significant effort was made on vocational training in an effort to help 
refugees return to work and collect some money both for them and for the camps. Yet the 
offer came in the form of work directed at women, like embroidery, sewing, etc. This was not 
new since this kind of work was done in the past by peasant women in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, etc. 
during their spare hours. For the men refugees, little work was provided. In some camps, 
basket weaving, woodwork, and carpeting were introduced but on the whole it remained 
marginal.136  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
There are few cases of a city overwhelmed by a million refugees in a matter of weeks as 
happened in Shanghai in late 1937. Although the challenge was tremendous, it was met more 
or less adequately thanks to a few advantages: it was a wealthy city where stocks of food and 
other materials did exist; the foreign settlements provided a place where goods could still be 
imported after fighting receded; there was a solid administrative and sanitary infrastructure 
that was quite able to cope with an acute emergency situation; Chinese society was irrigated 
by a dense network of associations, especially native-place associations, that bore the brunt of 
supporting and managing the refugee population; the largest number of refugees did find a 
solution by their own means or through their family, relatives and friends. In fact, at most a 
third of the whole refugee population was taken care of in camps.  Most refugees worked 
toward finding a way out to live “normally” again. Eighteen months after the beginning of the 
conflict, most had found a solution as can be seen from the drastic drop in camp population at 
the end of 1938. In other words, despite the trauma and the damages of war, the refugees were 
quick to turn themselves back into Shanghai residents with a place to live and a job to support 
their families. Undoubtedly, the resumption of economic activity in the second half of 1938 
and in 1939 created favorable conditions for the absorption of this population. Even if a 
minority seems to have been inclined to live off public charity (and probably most could 
simply not find proper means to live), refugees were hardly tempted by their condition in 
camps. They eagerly sought to bounce back into their previous life as active residents of 
Shanghai. 
 
The full-fledged war that erupted in Shanghai created a situation that called for innovative 
solutions. In the past, battles had been mostly fought outside of major urban areas. The 
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general evaluation that can be made is quite positive. The Shanghai International Relief 
Committee managed to provide support for 5.2 million refugee days, maintaining the per 
capita cost to 12,1 cents per day (or $3,64 per month).137 The people in charge of refugees in 
Shanghai worked with a clear consciousness that they were addressing issues of a new kind 
and scale, that they were trying to invent solutions to meet these new challenges and that their 
experience and the system they worked out would serve for reference in the future. They 
elaborated routines, they drew charts, they set up schemes with proper records and a will to 
leave behind “recipes” and sets of measures that could be duplicated and reproduced in other 
places should a similar situation occur. In particular, the Jacquinot safety zone was certainly 
the first initiative of its kind whereby good-will go-between manage to convince the 
belligerents to allow the civilian population to assemble in a “neutral” place to be protected 
from the ongoing fighting. In more recent conflicts, other similar forms of “safety” zone 
(safety corridor, etc.) have been opened with the same purpose. 
 
Gender is also an issue that draws lines in several ways during an armed conflict. On the side 
of assistance, there was a clear division of labor. Even if all volunteers were welcome in all 
tasks, women were directed “naturally” toward some duties such as clothing. One major actor 
in the Clothing committee summarized her experience as “it is better for a city organization 
like the Y.W.C.A. to mobilize all the women to help in this temporary yet necessary relief.”138 
On the side of the victims, we observed a higher proportion of women in the refugee 
population that could not reflect the sex balance in the population at large. Yet men were far 
more numerous among those who got sick and were treated in the refugee clinics. In other 
words, the proportion of sick men was far higher than that of women. We cannot draw any 
conclusion without a more detailed study of medical cases, but this imbalance is striking. As 
in any conflict, the most exposed were older people. They were few in numbers and many in 
the ranks of hospital patients. Nevertheless, the highest death toll was to be found among 
children. Insufficient diet, sanitary conditions, epidemics of benign though untreated diseases 
contributed to a massive loss of lives. 
 
War affected the population unevenly. Fighting took place in the most populous and most 
popular districts. As in most modern cities, social segregation was reflected in the distribution 
of the population in the various districts. In particular, the foreign settlements were home of 
the majority of the more well off, the new middle classes, etc., even if they also housed 
ordinary people. Zhabei, Hongkou, Yangshupu, Nantao figured prominently as popular 
districts with a population ranging from slum dwellers to workers, petty merchants, craftsmen, 
etc. These were people who either were on the brink of survival or had modest revenues. Few 
had substantial savings. When war threw them out of their place of living and work, they had 
nothing to rely on. They wandered in the streets, slept in alleys, wrecked buildings. Most went 
unaccounted for as all the statistical records do not generally include these unsupervised 
refugees of whom there were hundreds of thousands. They were human beings struck down 
by tragedy. The effects of the battle of Shanghai in human misfortune cost millions, and kept 
on costing money, time and energy. Highest of all was the cost in human suffering. 
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